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I. Introduction
The thesis of temporal becoming, wherein events are held to «pass,» «flow,» or
«shift» from the future to the present, and then recede into the past, has been
systematically dismantled and renounced by many philosophers. Bertrand Russell
(1915) and his followers have argued that the notion of temporal becoming has no
objective counterpart and, consequently, that it is psychological or illusory.
Despite the formidable problems involved in explicating the way in which time
passes, proponents of the temporal becoming theory or «A-theory» resolutely maintain
that there is temporal passage of some type and that it is ineradicable.  Furthermore,1
they contend that tensed language is not anomalous or egocentric, but a reflection of
the reality of passage.2
In recent years, George Schlesinger (1980) and others have attempted to
overcome some of the deficiencies of the temporal becoming theory by interpolating
higher orders of time (meta-times or super-times). These attempts have not withstood
rigorous scrutiny and thus appear unable to salvage the theory.3
The rival theory to temporal becoming, the so-called becomingless view or
«B-theory,» has its merits. However, this theory fails to account for salient aspects of
temporality. For these reasons, an alternative way of conceptualizing the experience of
temporal passage shall be proposed in this paper.
II. A Critique of the Becoming and Becomingless Views
The becoming and becomingless views have frequently been depicted as being
polarized. Thus, it is ironic that these theories have been encumbered and found
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objectionable for some of the same reasons, namely that they hypostatize events and
spatialize time. The passages set forth below epitomize these two views.
In interpreting J. M. E. McTaggart’s conception of temporal becoming which is
embodied in the A-series, Schlesinger writes:
A typical event … to begin with is in the distant future; then it becomes situated
in the less distant future; it keeps approaching us until it becomes an event occurring in the
present. As soon as this happens the event loses its presentness and acquires the property
of being in the near past. The degree of its pastness continually increases. (1980, p. 23)4
According to Adolf Grünbaum:
Instead of allowing for the transient division of time into the past and future by the
shifting Now of experienced time, the theory of relativity conceives of events as simply
being and sustaining relations of earlier and later, but not as ‘coming into being’: we
conscious organisms then ‘come across’ them by ‘entering’ into their absolute future, as it
were. And upon experiencing their immediate effects, we regard them as ‘taking place’ or
‘coming into being.’ (1963, pp. 318-319)
Events do not approach «us» on the becomingless view. Rather, as indicated, it
is consciousness which «comes across» (i.e., comes into awareness of) events.
Grünbaum (1963) has argued that Hermann Weyl’s well-known statement that
consciousness «crawls» upward along an individual’s world-line was metaphorical.
Accordingly, to explain the ambiguous relationship between consciousness and the
four-dimensional manifold, he formulated a theory in which there is a parallelism
between physical and mental events.  This dualistic theory has been exhaustively5
criticized  and hence will not be reviewed here.6
At one point in his career, C. D. Broad advanced a theory which affirmed the
reality of the past and present but not the future. In an exposition of this theory, Broad
asserted: «The sum total of existence is always increasing…» (1952, pp. 66-67) This
conclusion is inconsistent with the law of conservation of matter and energy. Also, it
has been disputed for various other reasons.  Broad’s theory and assertion are7
noteworthy because they demonstrate how one can be led astray by reifying events.
Broad (1959) later recanted his theory, protesting that it presupposes that the past
and present coexist, simultaneously. Not only was Broad’s objection well-taken, but
also it pertains (as Broad recognized) to the standard, triadic temporal becoming theory.
Nonexistent events could not possibly encroach upon the present from the future, nor
could they recede into the past from the present. Consequently, if there is temporal
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becoming, then past and future events must coexist (simultaneously) with present
events.
Grünbaum has vehemently denied the claim made by Mili @  ? apek (1976) and
others that the becomingless view entails that all events coexist, totum simul.  Nonethe-8
less, to the extent that all events in relativistic space-time are «written,» «laid out,» or
thought of as «simply being,» ? apek’s polemic is valid.
J. J. C. Smart (1980), L. Nathan Oaklander, and other B-theorists maintain that
there are two senses in which events can be said to «coexist.» In the first sense, which
B-theorists disclaim, all events exist at the same time. In the second sense, events
coexist (tenselessly) at different times. In advocating this view, Oaklander states: «All
events are part of a whole that is related by the temporal relations of earlier (later)
than and simultaneous with.» (1984, p. 228)
If an event of long duration can be divided into micro-events, then one can take
the converse approach and aggregate micro-events into a macro-event. For instance, the
Civil War is divisible into the various battles of the war or can be conceived of as a
single event. Ostensibly, the definition of an event does not hinge on duration.
Therefore, all the events «earlier than,» «simultaneous with,» and «later than» the Civil
War (or any other event) can legitimately be amassed into, and conceptualized as, a
singular macro-event. There would be no events earlier or later than an all-inclusive
event. In effect, there would be no B-series.
As indicated at the outset, some B-theorists have argued that the experience of
temporal passage can be discounted. They contend that this pervasive and unrelenting
illusion is attributable to the way in which tensed language is used, our increasing stock
of memories, or the flow of information through our short-term memories.9
Oaklander (1984) is one B-theorist who believes that the different attitudes
which people have towards the future and the past are justified. Oaklander also insists
that a B-theorist is not bound to disavow the deep-seated impression that time is
moving. He has used the following example to account for the experience of temporal
movement. At t  a man remarks that he is looking forward to his wife’s return from1
vacation (event e) at t  (in three weeks). A similar type of utterance is made by then
individual at t . Oaklander declares:2
At t  … the temporal span (duration) between t  and t  is less than the temporal span2 2 n
between t  and t . Finally, at t , the experience of joy occurs (tenselessly) and so does the1 n n
event e that [the man has] been anticipating at t  and t . On this account, the passage of1 2
time is reflected in the fact that different … utterances occur (tenselessly) at different times
and at different temporal distances from the time at which event e occurs. (1984, pp.
141-142)
This interpretation of temporal passage is untenable. At t  event e has not2
happened and in fact may not happen. There are many circumstances in which an
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individual would be unable to return from vacation. Thus, at t  it is unjustifiable to2
claim that there is anything more than a potential temporal relation between the
utterances and the anticipated event. The duration between the utterances and event e
cannot be calculated unless and until the event happens. Analogously, spatial distance
cannot be measured without two points.
In a series of integers exhibited on a coordinate line, the distance from two to
five is less than the distance from one to five. There is no apparent difference between
these spatial distance calculations, which must be regarded as timeless, and the account
of temporal passage under consideration.
III. The Meanings of Pass and Near
The words «pass» and «near» have myriad meanings and are used to express spatial
and temporal concepts. Insuperable difficulties arise, such as the inability to elucidate
the notion of temporal passage, when the spatially related meanings of these words are
substituted for the temporal meanings. Accordingly, through a phenomenological and
linguistic analysis, an attempt will be made to disentangle the various subtle and
interrelated ways in which these two philosophically important words are used.
There is a linearization of time on the becoming and becomingless views. On
one view, the events which constitute the line flow inexorably from the future to the
present whereupon they «pass by» stationary observers (the river of time metaphor). On
the variation of the becomingless view espoused by Weyl and the physicist James
Jeans,  consciousness voyages along («passes by») and thereby illuminates different10
parts of a shadowy, nonflowing river (the «frozen river of time» metaphor).11
When a riverboat or other object «passes by» something, such as the em-
bankment or stationary observers, this is purely incidental to its change of position.
Comparably, time cannot «pass by» «us» unless it is in motion. As suggested above,
some prominent versions of the becoming and becomingless views involve the
movement of time or consciousness. Indeed, this is one of the primary reasons why
these theories have been fraught with intolerable absurdities and contradictions. There
is no temporal motion and consciousness most assuredly cannot move. How, then, are
the following perceptions and inferences, and the utterances by which they are
conveyed, to be explained?
As wind rustles through the trees and dark clouds appear on the horizon, an
individual declares that a rainstorm is «near,» «coming,» or «on its way.» Shortly after
this utterance, the person learns that a storm watch has been issued because the
«conditions are favorable.» Upon sighting a robin after a harsh winter, a person joyfully
proclaims that «spring is near.» An expectant mother remarks that the «time is drawing
near» or that the anticipated event is «just around the corner» or «getting close.»
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The first example will be used at this point to clarify the relationship between
«pass» and «near.» An individual anticipates that it will soon rain on his or her house.
As the storm moves towards the house, it may deceive one into believing that the
anticipated event is moving from the future and «becoming present.» Furthermore,
when the storm clouds «pass over» the house and the rain begins, it buttresses the
notion that the event «became present.» Finally, the event may seem to retreat into the
past as the storm «passes by» and moves away from the house.
As implied, anticipation and the perception of motion are two factors which
reinforce the spurious belief that events pass from the future and move towards «us.»
To see that this notion is indeed misconceived, consider what it was that moved. It was
the storm clouds that moved, not the anticipated event. More generally, as Smart
pointed out, «things change, events happen.» (1949, p. 485)
When an event is temporally «near,» this does not mean that there is a short
«temporal span» between two events, that a future event has moved closer to the
present, or that consciousness has moved closer to an event. In short, the time-related
form of «near» is not denotative of spatial distance. However, as represented by the
equation for calculating average speed, there is a relationship between distance, time,
and speed. For example, when the storm clouds were sixty miles away (position or P ),1
they would have been considered spatially distant and the anticipated event would have
been thought of as being temporally «distant.» In contrast, the event is considered
temporally «near» when the storm is positioned adjacent to or over the house (P ).9
The anticipated event will not happen unless certain conditions are satisfied. One
of these necessary conditions is that the storm clouds must be positioned over the
house. The storm cannot move from P  to P  without traversing P  to P . As the storm1 9 2 8
clouds «pass through» these intermediate positions, it is recognized that one of the
conditions necessary for the event is being met. With the attainment of a necessary
condition, the event would be «nearer» to happening.
To expand upon these thoughts, a familiar example of qualitative change will be
employed since it is not as complex as positional change and there is an understanding
of the causal mechanics involved in the process. At t  a farmer asserts that a particular1
crop will emerge from the soil (henceforth event A) at t . The conditions which are6
necessary for event A include nutritive soil, seed, proper temperature, and the correct
amount of water.  These conditions will be referred to as p, q, r, and s, respectively.12
Some of the conditions, such as p, are in place at t . However, other conditions,1
for example r and s, are unmet at t . As things change (e.g., earth changes its position1
relative to the sun), there is a correlative attainment of the conditions necessary to
cause event A (the effect). Suppose that at t  conditions p, q, and r are met. At t  all the4 5
necessary conditions are met such that they are jointly sufficient for event A. Finally,
at t  the event happens as was anticipated.6
The temporally related utterances, made by an individual in this type of context,
reflect the degree of causal attainment. At t  the anticipated event is considered1
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«distant,» while at t , after several conditions have been attained, the event is said to4
be «near.»
There are instances when a person would not conclude that an event was
temporally «near» even though there had been a substantial attainment of the conditions
necessary to cause the event. To provide an example, suppose that a large amount of
toxic chemical had been inadvertently spilled onto the soil at t . The individual is aware4
that the seeds were planted in nutritive soil and that the temperature had been
conducive to the anticipated event. However, it is also recognized that the chemical
may prevent event A from happening.
The preceding thoughts can be formalized in the following definition and
postulate:
The temporally related locution of «near» means that the conditions which are
causally necessary for an event have substantially been met and that there has not been an
attainment of condition(s) which would obviate the occurrence of the event.13
This postulate raises an epistemological question. In the example cited above,
the individual would have had at least a cursory awareness of the degree of causal
attainment. However, in the case of an inconspicuous or complicated process, how
could one possibly have knowledge that an event is imminent?
By establishing a timekeeping system, thereby allowing comparative change14
to be measured, inferences can be and are made regarding the degree to which the
necessary conditions for an event have been met. For example, in the eighth gestational
month, an expectant mother discerns that the event is temporally proximate. This
realization is possible even though the individual does not have a direct awareness of
the physiological conditions which cause the event. Thus, the conclusion that an event
is «near» can be reached without a presupposed and detailed knowledge of causal
mechanics.
Recall, in the first example, the person asserted that a rainstorm was «near»
based on various evidence such as the position and darkness of clouds. Obviously,
opaque clouds are not a necessary condition for rain. However, this condition, since it
occurs immediately antecedent to the anticipated event, functions equivalently to a
timekeeping device by allowing an estimation to be made of the degree of causal
attainment.
An example will help demonstrate the preceding point. Assume that conditions
a, b, and c cause event D (the anticipated effect). Further, assume that condition b is
unnoticeable, but that a non-causally related condition s invariably or generally occurs
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contemporaneously with b. Although b is imperceptible, the degree of causal attainment
regarding event D can be ascertained by observing condition s in conjunction with the
appreciable necessary conditions.
In denouncing the becomingless view, G. J. Whitrow queries: «If the future
history of the universe pre-exists logically in the present, why is it not already
present?»  Relatedly, Smart (1963) has argued that if pastness, presentness, and futurity15
are intrinsic properties of events, then it is necessary to explain why events become
present at one date and not at some other.
Why does an event happen at one time and not at another? For instance, if event
A had occurred at t  instead of at t  (the anticipated time), what factors would explain10 6
this discrepancy? A-theorists, who also countenance an absolute theory of time, could
respond to this question by asserting that time decelerated whereupon there was a
concomitant deceleration in the approach of event A from the future. Alternatively, they
might conjecture that time, for some impenetrable reason, swept other events into being
before event A which resulted in the delay. The first response is patently absurd and
the second one is not very illuminating.
Typically, when an event fails to happen, or happens earlier or later than
expected, people do not invoke the notion of temporal movement as an explanation.
Rather, they appeal (properly) to the idea of physical necessity: a person would likely
say that event A happened later than expected because it was «colder than normal» or
there was insufficient rain during a particular month. In other words, the event did not
happen at t  because the conditions at t  were causally insufficient for the event.6 5
As argued, the experience of temporal passage can be and, to some extent, is  
understood in terms of causal principles. This is the first of two postulates which 
constitute «The Causal Attainment Theory of Temporal Passage» (CAT-TP).
IV. The Hybrid-Series
Since the enunciation of the theory of relativity and the publication of McTaggart’s  
(1908) and Russell’s (1915) thought-provoking articles, efforts in the philosophy of  
time have been primarily directed at resolving the antinomy between the dynamic  
(A-series) and static (B-series) aspects of time. The A and B-series are inherently  
flawed in the form in which they were presented and have been refined. However, there 
are also elements of truth in both of the series. This suggests that a unification of the 
two series will provide the most viable alternative for relating the notion of temporal  
passage with the changeless relations of time.
Before a synthesis can be reached, however, it will be necessary to specify 
and extirpate those components of the A and B-series which are 
contradictory or extraneous. It will also be necessary to identify the authentic 
components of the two
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series. To identify one of the contradictions of the B-theory, we can turn to Broad.
Regarding the statement «the Battle of Hastings precedes the Battle of Waterloo by 749
years,» he has written:
Such phraseology would suggest that the two events are two particulars which (a)
somehow coexist either timelessly or simultaneously, and yet (b) stand timelessly or
sempiternally in a certain temporal relation of precedence. This must be nonsense…16
A tenseless statement, such as «the Civil War is earlier than World War I,» gives
the misleading impression that the two events have a reality apart from the people who
fought the wars. Vestiges (e.g., weapons) of these wars may exist, but there is no Civil
War or World War lurking «out there.» The events happened, but they did not exist.
It was the continuants, namely the people and armaments, which existed.
There are no events «in the future.» Furthermore, it is erroneous to make the
following type of claim: «1970 … is earlier than 2850.» (Grünbaum 1963, p. 315.)
Granted, many of the events of 2850 can be predicted and will likely happen. However,
this is radically different from alleging that there is a relation between the events which
happened in 1970 and anticipated events. The events of 2850 will happen if, and only
if, the conditions necessary for the events are causally sufficient.
There is no event which «is later than» a present event. However, once an event
happens, it is then valid to use the following types of modified (tensed) B-series
statements: (1) event X is happening simultaneous with another event; (2) event X is
happening later than event W happened. Moreover, once event X is no longer occurring,
one could say: (3) event X happened earlier than, simultaneous with, or later than some
other event. For instance, it is permanently true that the Civil War «happened earlier
than» World War I and that World War I «happened later than» the Civil War. These
types of tensed B-series statements are preferable to the tenseless statements since they
reflect, not only the unchanging relation between those events which are happening or
have happened, but also the nonspatial nature of time.
On the temporal becoming theory, events recede into the «past.» Recent events
do seem more immediate than those events which did not happen recently. There is no
need, however, to posit metaphysical properties to convey this notion. By using an
ordinal scaling method, a «near» and «distant» past can be represented with tensed
B-series statements as follows: (1) e  occurred earlier than e ; (2) e  occurred much1 2 1
earlier than e . In fact, by dating events and thereby establishing an interval scale, this5
notion is implicitly represented.  For example, if events C and D happened in 1200 and17
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1992, respectively, it is, obviously, unnecessary to state that event C happened «much
earlier than» event D.
According to some A-theorists, events acquire and then discard the property of
«presentness.» Events do not «come into being» unless they have acquired this strange
property. But how can something acquire a property unless it exists? Thus, the
argument that «presentness» is a property of events is circular; an event would have to
exist «in the future» in order to «come into being.»
There have been numerous unsuccessful attempts to discover a physical basis for
temporal becoming. Since events on the temporal becoming theory shift relative to the
present, these attempts have typically focused on defining or identifying «the present.»
For example, Hans Reichenbach, inspired by quantum mechanics, once defined the
present as «the moment at which that which was undetermined becomes determined
…»  Grünbaum (1963) and Richard Gale (1968), following in the steps of Hugo18
Bergmann, have assailed Reichenbach’s criterion since it does not single out any one
event, in the history of the world, as being «the present.»
There is no property of «presentness» which is intrinsic to events. Hence, no
attempt will be made to find a physical basis for «the present.» There is, however, a
relationship between when an event happens and a physical criterion. On the necessary
and sufficient version of causation, an event happens if, and only if, certain requisite
conditions are met.  This is a natural limitation which can be utilized to distinguish19
between potentialities, present events, and the set of events which happened earlier than
present events. Before this task is pursued, some clarifying information regarding the
necessary and sufficient version of causation will be presented.
Inasmuch as the relation between causes and their effects is symmetrical on the
necessary and sufficient version of causation, the theory is incomplete. Consequently,
for this analysis, the theory will be and has been coupled with the notion (as is often
done) that the difference between a cause and its effect is one of temporal priority.
Hereinafter, this theory will be referred to as the «complete necessary and sufficient
theory of causation.»
Recall, the reason that event A was considered near at t  was because a large4
proportion of the conditions necessary for the event had been met at that time. For this
reason, there is a temptation to conclude that event A was present (i.e., happening) once
the following criterion was satisfied: there was an attainment of the necessary
conditions. Conditions p through s were sufficient for event A at t , yet the event did5
not happen until t . Since the criterion was met before the event had occurred, it is6
unworkable in association with the complete necessary and sufficient theory of
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causation, where, by definition, cause X is sufficient for effect Y before Y is sufficient
for X. Incidentally, this criterion would be feasible if causes occur simultaneously with
their effects.
There is a way to define present events based on a physical criterion. Event A
happened or was present at t , a time at which the event was sufficient for its cause.6
Based on this criterion, potentialities can be defined as the set of events which have the
capacity to occur, and, relative to present events, are insufficient for their causes.
To reconcile the becoming and becomingless views, the residual components of
the A and B-series have been reconstructed into a hybrid-series. As alluded to, this
trichotomous series includes potentialities, present events, and the set of events which
happened earlier than present events. Stated differently, the hybrid-series is an amalgam
of the tensed B-series and potentialities.
At this point, it may be advantageous to recapitulate the CAT-TP in terms of the
example which has been used throughout this paper. At t  event A was a potentiality.1
At t  there was a substantial attainment of the conditions necessary for event A such4
that it was proclaimed that the event was «near.» Event A happened at a time (t ) at6
which it was sufficient for its cause. Once this criterion was met, it could be stated that
the effect (event A) «occurred later than» its cause or that the cause «happened earlier
than» its effect.
There are significant differences between the hybrid-series and the A and
B-series. The hybrid-series is eliminative of the properties «pastness» and «futurity.»
Furthermore, the phrase «present events» differs from the «now» in that it has been
divested of its ontological status. The idea of the shifting present, which is the
cornerstone of the temporal becoming theory, has been eschewed. It is true that what
was perceived yesterday is different from what is being perceived today. This notion,
however, reflects nothing more than that there are events which happen (tensely) and
are perceptible at different times.
Oaklander embraces the idea that temporal relations are simple entities which
belong to the «ontological furniture of the world.» Regarding this premise, he writes:
«Such a recognition in turn implies viewing temporal relations as descriptive relations;
in order for them to obtain between and among events, the events themselves (the relata
of the relations) must exist.» (1984, p. 19)  One reason that B-theorists, such as20
Oaklander, consider the A-theory impoverished is because the theory must somehow
relate nonexistent or possible future events to existent present events. The B-theory is
able to avert this problem, but only by spatializing time.
On the hybrid-series, there are temporal relations between present events and the
set of events which happened earlier than present events. There is only a potential
relation between potentialities and those events which are happening or have happened.
However, once an effect is sufficient for its cause, it is assimilated into the network of
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fixed temporal relations. In this way, physical necessity acts as a gatekeeper or
mediator between potentialities and the tensed B-series.
As argued previously, the A-theory entails a totum simul to the extent that events
are thought of as moving towards or away from the present. Also, as suggested above,
the types of relations envisaged by B-theorists would not be possible without a totum
simul. With physical necessity as a gatekeeper to the network of temporal relations, this
would explain why every event does not happen at once.
V. A Defense of the Proposed Theory
Causal theories of time integrate ideas from two broad, interconnected, and recondite
areas of philosophic thought. As a result, they can be challenged from several angles.
The CAT-TP is no exception. Therefore, at this juncture, only a limited defense of the
theory shall be undertaken. Some of the potential objections have been addressed in the
course of outlining the theory.
Broad argued that motion and qualitative change presuppose becoming.21
Similarly, despite Russell’s insistence to the contrary, McTaggart (1908) steadfastly
maintained that there could be no change without the A-series. These types of
arguments have been used against the B-theory and could also be employed against the
proposed theory.
In Scientific Thought, Broad characterized becoming as a «change of time» as
opposed to a «change in time.» A «change of time» means that an event changes with
respect to its «A-characteristics.» As intimated in the preceding section, this notion of
temporal change is discredited by its circularity. Also, it presupposes that events exist
«in the future» and that they are thing-like (i.e., capable of changing qualitatively).
Since there are no A-characteristics, the claim that there are «changes of time»
is meaningless. More generally, since the dynamic account of temporal passage has
proven to be unintelligible, the argument that the CAT-TP presupposes temporal or
absolute becoming is not credible.
Having appreciated the relationship between time and causality in the special
theory of relativity, a number of contemporary philosophers, including Reichenbach
(1956) and Grünbaum (1963), advanced causal theories of time. Multiple criticisms
have been leveled against the causal theory of time.  The most pernicious objection to22
the theory is that it is circular. In the Humean regularity theory of causation, as well
as in the complete necessary and sufficient theory of causation, causal asymmetry is
derived from an underlying, primitive temporal relation. The causal theory of time and
its variations are based on the antithetical position. Hence, they are, or at least appear
to be, incompatible with the prevailing belief that the sole difference between a cause
and its effect is one of temporal precedence.
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The CAT-TP diverges from the causal theory of time insofar as it is not based
on the supposition that temporal order is reducible to causal order. Therefore, the
charge of circularity is inapplicable to the proposed theory.
6. Concluding Remarks
The CAT-TP has been propounded as an alternative to the becoming and becomingless
views. In this essay, among other things, an attempt has been made to elucidate the
meanings of the words «pass» and «near.» The words «approach» and «advance» have
also played a central role in the temporal becoming theory; events are held to
«approach» the present or «us» from the future. Because of their significance and
relationship to «pass» and «near,» these words have also been indirectly scrutinized.
As was discovered with «pass» and «near,» «approach» and «advance» have
numerous, interrelated spatial and temporal meanings. The words «approach,» «pass»
(passing through), and «advance» can all denote a movement of an object between two
spatial positions. This is the meaning which has been illicitly associated with, and
thereby tainted, the notion of temporal passage.
The words «approach» and «advance» can also denote accomplishment, achieve-
ment, and attainment. This meaning captures the essence of the experience of temporal
passage. Accordingly, it has been embodied within the first postulate which can be
restated as follows: the temporally related form of the words «near» and «distant»
reflect the degree to which the requisite steps have been completed, or the necessary
conditions have been met, for an event to happen.
Thus, the impression that events approach the present is explicable without
positing nomadic, substantialized events. Moreover, other aspects of the experience of
temporal passage, such as the shifting present, can also be explained without the
A-series.
The tenseless B-series provides a foundation for temporal relations. However,
it is artificial and discordant with the experience of temporal passage. Furthermore, the
amassment of all micro-events into a singular macro-event obliterates the tenseless
B-series. When the B-series is used conditionally (i.e., it is not used to refer to events
later than present events), and is modified to express the nonspatial nature of time, it
is veritable.
The first postulate of the CAT-TP symbolizes the experience of becoming,
whereby events «approach» from the «future.» The second postulate or hybrid-series
concerns the type of temporal structure that is needed to account for this experience in
a coherent fashion. More work will be required to test the plausibility of these
postulates, although when taken together they appear to provide a reasonable
framework for harmonizing the immutable, relational aspects of time with the
experience of temporal passage.
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